By George Njung
A keen observer and perusal of electoral outcomes in Cameroon in the 1990s will agree that the CPDM under Paul Biya, was more victorious in the rural areas than as in the urban based constituencies.
Thus the CPDM party's electoral strongholds are, regrettably, to be found rather in the rural constituencies of Cameroon. What an electoral sarcasm! During the 1996 municipal elections into the 336 urban and rural communes of Cameroon, the CPDM won 219 of the 336 communes and 6,033 of the 9,986 councillors.
The demographic distribution of the vote was less favourable to the CPDM regime. The CPDM was confined to the Centre, South and East provinces and to the rural areas elsewhere with salaried chiefs or government ministers heading many CPDM lists (Takougang and Krieger: 1999: 197).
After the council elections, of 31 mayors in Cameroon's urban areas, twelve were CPDM, twelve SDF and three were from the National Union for Democracy and Progress, NUDP.The 11 largest of these urban councils elected six SDF, two CPDM and two NUDP mayors, leaving one post in dispute.
The demographic reality was that the SDF got 40 percent of those 11 largest urban community seats, including landslide sweeps in Douala, Nkongsamba and Bafoussam, and a share of Yaounde; the NUDP took Garoua and Maroua, while the CPDM only got most of Yaounde and Ebolowa.
The CPDM 219 won communes were generating only 25 percent of Cameroon's local revenue, which meant a distinct threat in future to the coffers of the CPDM party. We see, therefore, that the party's electoral victories were only cosmetic.
Can it, therefore, be said that in the 1996 council elections, the CPDM won or it lost? In any case, to stay at the helm of affairs and make sure that his political tentacles inculcated and maintained the necessary economic and financial base, Biya quickly exercised his unlimited constitutional prowess by proceeding to appoint Government Delegates to boss the affairs of those urban-based councils that were won by the opposition.
Rural Electors And Urban Electors
The rural man in Cameroon like elsewhere in Africa is more traditional and clings to tradition more than the urban-based man. In Cameroon, tradition has inculcated in the rural man a certain amount of defence towards authority. In the rural areas, it is a sacrilege to flout the chief's authority.
Though customary sanctions of abuse of power may exist, there is considerable toleration of arbitrariness by the local leaders. This attitude towards local authorities tends to be transformed to the modern political leader.
Indeed, most of the people in the rural areas, who are largely illiterates and more custom bound, are not disposed to question the leader's authority, and therefore disapprove of those who are inclined to do so. The Head of State in effect is the chief of the new nation, and as such entitled to the authority and respect due by tradition to the chief (Etonga: 1980:141).
This is one of the major things that make the arguments of the opposition about the arbitrariness and autocracy of the incumbent untenable and unappealing to the rural masses.
The economic backwardness of the Cameroon state works, strangely enough, in favour of the regime in power. In a situation where the state is the principal employer of labour as well as the major provider of social amenities, and where a personal ambition for power and wealth and influence rather than principle determines political affiliations and alliances, power to dispense patronage is a very potent weapon in the hands of the president, enabling him to gain and maintain the loyalty of the people at various levels of the society and notably at the rural levels (Etonga: 1980: 142).
The CPDM campaign bulwarks always use this to frighten the illiterate rural masses that should they vote against the regime, they would be deprived of the social amenities they already have. They are told that the opposition is poor and has nothing to offer. Naïve as they are, the illiterate rural masses fail to differentiate between the existing state and political institutions and the individuals controlling them.
So they fail to understand that should the opposition win, it would simply inherit the already existing institutions and possibly improve on them. What the masses rightly deserve from the state, they are told by the CPDM party bulwarks that such things are privileges.
No wonder that when a village which has not had a common secondary school for years and which deserves one, is offered one by the state, or a son of soil is appointed in government from that village, or a road is to be constructed to an enclave village, the regime flag bearers in that village mobilise the poor masses to write motions of support and thank the Head of State for giving them those things.
Belly Politics
Most Cameroonians get into the CPDM party because they want to obtain positions in government, keep themselves there and amass wealth for themselves. They, therefore, induce the rural masses with money and gifts during elections to vote the party in power. They tell the illiterate rural masses that their village will be developed if they vote for the CPDM.
So it is "scratch my back I scratch your back politics," the campaign theme adopted by the former Prime Minister, Achidi Achu during the 1996 municipal election campaign.This campaign strategy worked well in most rural areas even though it failed in his own Santa constituency. And after that election, Achidi Achu was dismissed since the rural electorates of Santa failed to "scratch the back" of the party that gave them a prime minister.
This is an aspect of belly politics in Cameroon (Bayart: 1993). This political practice and the lofty idea of coaxing the electorates with gifts and money to vote for the party in power is more appealing to the rural masses of Cameroon.
In the same vein, there is the "rice" diplomacy invoked by the CPDM officials during elections where bags of rice were distributed mostly to the rural voters by the CPDM campaign officials. This attracted the electorates, to rush to the CPDM campaign grounds shouting "rice oh yea yea; CPDM, oh yea yea', and they got rice in abundance.
Overzealous and selfish Rural Leaders
Some of the local chiefs out of greed, selfishness and under the influence of belly politics, attributed to themselves the task of ensuring CPDM victory in their local fiefs with the intention of occupying parliamentary seats and getting appointed to political positions. The case of Fon Doh Gah Gwanyin of the Balikumbat during the 1997 parliamentary elections in Cameroon in the Northwest Province is a glaring example.
Under his auspices, by use of force, autocracy and complete hijack of the electoral process, he enabled the CPDM to win the lone parliamentary seat in the Northwest Province in Balikumbat with himself as the elected parliamentarian. Besides personal greed, some of the chiefs and fons were bought over by the CPDM party hierarchy to influence their rural electors to vote for CPDM.
Isn't it sarcastic that the CPDM obtained its electoral victories in areas where the regime neglected most in terms of state development? Isn't it sarcastic that the CPDM party, the one that should be more national in nature and scope, got its support mostly from the rural areas of Cameroon?
And isn't it time for the rural masses of Cameroon to take their place in the new political dispensation and vote out the party that has been unable to provide them with social amenities and economic prosperity like roads, hospitals, schools, etc?
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